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Summnary  findings
Using bank  data  for  80 countries  for  1988-95,  earning  assets  are less profitable.  Also, banks  that  rely
Demirgii-Kunt  and Huizinga  show  that  differences  in  largely  on deposits  for  their  funding  are less profitable,
interest  margins  and  bank  profitability  reflect  various  as deposits  require  more  branching  and  other  expenses.
determinants:  Similarly,  variations  in overhead  and  other  operating
•  Bank characteristics,  costs  are reflected  in variations  in bank  interest  margins,
*  Macroeconomic  conditions.  as banks  pass their  operating  costs  (including  the
*  Explicit  and  implicit  bank  taxes.  corporate  tax burden)  on to their  depositors  and  lenders.
*  Regulation  of deposit  insurance.  *  In  developing  countries  foreign  banks  have  greater
*  General  financial  structure.  margins  and profits  than  domestic  banks.  In industrial
*  Several underlying  legal and  institutional  indicators.  countries,  the  opposite  is true.
Controlling  for  differences  in bank  activity,  leverage,  and  e  Macroeconomic  factors  also  explain  variation  in
the  macroeconomic  environment,  they  find  (among  interest  margins.  Inflation  is associated  with  higher
other  things)  that:  realized  interest  margins  and greater  profitability.
*  Banks  in countries  with  a more  com.petitive  banking  Inflation  brings  higher  costs  - more  transactions  and
sector  - where  banking  assets constitute  a larger  share  generally  more  extensive  branch  networks  - and  also
of  GDP - have smaller  margins  and are  less profitable.  more  income  from  bank  float.  Bank income  increases
The  bank  concentration  ratio  also affects  bank  more  with inflation  than  bank  costs do.
profitability;  larger  banks tend  to have higher  margins.  *  There  is evidence  that  the  corporate  tax  burden  is
*  Well-capitalized  banks  have higher  net interest  fully passed  on to bank  customers  in poor  and  rich
margins  and  are more  profitable.  This  is consistent  with  countries  alike.
the  fact that  banks  with higher  capital  ratios  have a lower  - Legal  and institutional  differences  matter.  Indicators
cost  of funding  because  of lower  prospective  bankruptcy  of better  contract  enforcement,  efficiency  in the  legal
costs.  system,  and lack  of corruption  are associated  with  lower
*  Differences  in a bank's  activity  mix  affect  spread  realized  interest  margins  and  lower  profitability.
and  profitability.  Banks  with  relatively  high noninterest-
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manuscript.1.  Introduction
As financial  intermediaries,  banks  play a crucial  role in the operation  of most
economies. Recent  research,  as surveyed  by Levine  (1996),  has shown  that the efficacy
of financial  intermediation  can also affect  economic  growth.  Crucially,  financial
intermediation  affects  the net return  to savings,  and the gross  return for investment. The
spread  between  these two returns  mirrors  the bank interest  margins,  in addition  to
transaction  costs and taxes borne  directly  by savers  and investors. This suggests  that
bank interest spreads  can be interpreted  as an indicator  of the efficiency  of the banking
system.  In this paper, we investigate  how bank interest  spreads  are affected  by taxation,
the structure  of the financial  system,  and financial  regulations  such deposit  insurance.
A comprehensive  review  of determinants  of interest  spreads  is offered  by Hanson
and Rocha (1986).  That  paper summarizes  the role that implicit  and explicit  taxes play in
raising  spreads  and goes on to discuss  some  of the determinants  of bank cost and profits,
such as inflation,  scale  economies,  and market  structure.  Using  aggregate  interest  data for
29 countries  in the years 1975-1983,  the authors  find a positive  correlation  between
interest margins  and inflation.
Recently,  several  studies  have  examined  the impact  of international  differences  in
bank regulation  using cross-country  data. Analyzing  interest  rates in 13 OECD  countries
in the years 1985-1990,  Bartholdy,  Boyle, and Stover  (1997)  find that the existence  of
explicit  deposit  insurance  lowers  the deposit  interest  rate by 25 basis  points. Using data
from 19 developed  countries  in 1993,  Barth,  Nolle and Rice (1997)  further  examine  the
impact  of banking  powers  on bank return on equity  - controlling  for a variety  of bank
2and market characteristics. Variation in banking powers, bank concentration and the
existence of explicit deposit insurance do not significantly affect the return on bank
equity.
This paper extends the existing literature several ways.  First, using bank-level
data for 80 developed and developing countries in the 1988-1995 period, we provide
summary statistics on size and decomposition of bank interest margins and profitability.
Second, we use regression analysis to examine the underlying determinants of interest
spreads and bank profitability. The empirical work enables us to infer to what extent the
incidence of taxation and regulation is on bank customers and/or the banks themselves.
Apart from covering many banks in many countries, this study is unique in its
coverage of interest margin and profitability determinants. These determinants include a
comprehensive set of bank characteristics (such as size, leverage, type of business,
foreign ownership), macro indicators, taxation and regulatory variables, financial
structure variables, and legal and institutional indices. Among these, the ownership
variable, the tax variables, some of the financial structure variables, and the legal and
institutional indicators have not been included in any previous study in this area.  To
check whether some of these determinants affect banking differently in developing and
developed countries, we further interact these variables with the country's  GDP per
capita.
The results indicate that bank characteristics, macro indicators, implicit and
explicit financial taxation, deposit insurance, overall financial structure, and the legal and
institutional environment all significantly affect bank interest spreads and profitability.
3Our results show  that well-capitalized  banks have higher  net interest  margins  and
are more  profitable. This is consistent  with the fact that  banks with higher capital  ratios
tend to face a lower  cost of funding  due to lower  prospective  bankruptcy  costs. In
addition,  a bank with higher equity  capital  simply  needs  to borrow  less in order  to support
a given level of assets.
Differences  in the bank activity  mix also have an impact  on spreads  and
profitability. Our results show  that banks with relatively  high non-interest  earning  assets
are less profitable.  Also,  banks that rely largely  on deposits  for their funding  are less
profitable,  as deposits  apparently  require  high branching  and other expenses.  Similarly,
variation  in overhead  and other  operating  costs is reflected  in variation  in bank interest
margins,  as banks pass on their operating  costs to their depositors  and lenders.
The international  ownership  of banks also has a significant  impact  on bank
spreads  and profitability.  Foreign  banks,  specifically,  realize  higher  interest  margins  and
higher  profitability  than domestic  banks in developing  countries.  This finding  may  reflect
that in developing  countries  a foreign  bank's technological  edge  is relatively  strong,
apparently  strong  enough  to overcome  any informational  disadvantage.  Foreign  banks,
however,  are shown  to be less profitable  in developed  countries.
Macroeconomic  factors  also explain  variation  in interest  margins. We find that
inflation  is associated  with higher  realized  interest  margins  and higher  profitability.
Inflation  entails  higher costs -more transactions,  and generally  more extensive  branch
networks  - and also higher income  from bank float. The positive  relationship  between
inflation  and bank profitability  implies  that bank income  increases  more with inflation
4than bank costs. Further,  high real interest  rates  are associated  with higher interest
margins and profitability,  especially  in developing  countries. This may reflect  that in
developing  countries  demand  deposits  frequently  pay zero or below market  interest  rates.
Banks  are subject  to implicit  and explicit  taxation  which  may affect  their
operations.  Implicit  taxes include  reserve  and liquidity  requirements  that are remunerated
at less-than-market  rates. 2 We find that reserves  reduce  interest  margins  and profits
especially  in developing  countries,  since  there the opportunity  cost of holding  reserves
tends  to be higher and remuneration  rates  are lower.  Explicit  taxes translate  into higher
net interest  margins  and bank profitability.  In fact,  the regression  coefficients  suggest  that
the corporate  tax is fully  passed  on to bank customers  in poor and rich countries  alike,
and is not simply  a tax on bank rents. This result is consistent  with the common  notion
that bank stock investors  need  to receive  a net-of-company-tax  return that is independent
of this company  tax.
The existence  of an explicit  deposit  insurance  scheme  coincides  with lower
interest  margins.  The effect  on bank profitability  is also negative,  although  it is not
significant.  These  results may  reflect design  and implementation  problems  inherent  in
explicit  deposit  insurance  systems.
Regarding  financial  structure,  banks in countries  with a more competitive  banking
sector -- where banking  assets constitute  a larger portion  of the GDP -- have smaller
margins  and are less  profitable.  The bank concentration  ratio positively  affects  bank
2 Directed  and subsidized  credit  practices  that  interfere  with  the banks' credit  allocation  policies  represent
additional  implicit  taxes.  However,  due to lack of data for most of the countries  in our sample  we do not
evaluate  the impact  of such practices  here.
5profitability,  and larger banks tend  to have  higher margins.  A larger stock  market
capitalization  to GDP increases  bank margins,  reflecting  possible  complementarity
between  debt  and equity  financing.  A larger stock  market capitalization  to bank assets,
however,  is related  negatively  to margins,  suggesting  relatively  well-developed  stock
markets  can substitute  for bank finance.
Finally,  we find that legal and institutional  differences  matter.  Indicators  of better
contract  enforcement,  efficiency  of the legal system  and lack of corruption  are associated
with lower  realized  interest  margins  and lower  profitability.
Section  2 next  describes  the basic approach  of this study. Section  3 discusses  the
data. Section  4 presents  the empirical  results. Section  5 concludes.
2.  Investigating  banking  spreads  andprofitability
The efficiency  of bank intermediation  can be measured  by both ex ante and ex
post spreads.  Ex ante spreads  are calculated  from the contractual  rates charged  on loans
and rates  paid on deposits.  Ex post spreads  consist of the difference  between  banks'
interest  revenues  and their actual  interest expenses. The ex ante  measures  of spread  are
biased  to the extent  that differences  in perceived  risks  are reflected  in the ex ante  yields.
Since  bearing  of risk is an important  dimension  of banking  services,  any differences  in
the risks faced  by bankers  will tend  to distort spread  comparisons.  An additional  problem
with using ex ante spread  measures  is that data are generally  available  at the aggregate
industry  level and are put together  from a variety  of different  sources  and thus are not
6completely  consistent. For these reasons,  we focus on ex post interest spreads  in this
paper.3
As a measure  of bank efficiency,  we consider  the accounting  value of a bank's net
interest income  over total assets,  or the net interest  margin.  To reflect bank profitability,
we consider  the bank's before-tax  profits over total assets,  or before tax  profit/ta. By
straightforward  accounting, before tax  profit/ta is the sum of after-tax  profits over total
assets,  or net  profit/ta, and taxes  over total assets,  or tax/ta. From the bank's income
statement,  before  tax  profit/ta further  satisfies  the following accounting  identity:
(1)  before tax profit/ta  = net interest margin + non-interest income/ta - overhead/ta
- loan loss provisioning/ta
where  the non-interest  income/ta  variable  reflects  that many  banks also engage  in non-
lending  activities,  such as investment  banking  and brokerage  services;  the overhead/ta
variable  accounts  for the bank's entire  overhead  associated  with all its activities,  while
loan loss  provisioning/ta  simply  measures  actual  provisioning  for bad debts.
While net interest  margin  can be interpreted  as a rough index of bank
(in)efficiency,  this does not mean  that a reduction  in net interest  margins  always  signals
improved  bank efficiency.  To see  this, note  that a reduction  in net interest  margins  can,
for example,  reflect a reduction  in bank taxation  or, alternatively,  a higher loan default
3 A problem  with ex post spreads,  however,  is that the interest  income  and loan loss  reserving  associated
with  a particular  loan tend  to materialize  in different  time  periods.  Due to differences  in nonperforming
loans/or  monitoring  costs  associated  with  loan quality,  these spreads  may not reflect  efficiency  differences
accurately.
7rate. In the first instance, the reduction in net interest margins reflects an improved
financial market function, while in the second case the opposite may be true. Also, note
that variation in an accounting ratio such as net interest margin may reflect differences in
net interest income (the numerator) or differences in (say) non-lending assets (in the
denominator). The data used have been converted to common international accounting
standards as far as possible. All the same, there may still be some remaining differences
in accounting conventions regarding the valuation of assets, loan loss provisioning,
hidden reserves, etc. 4
This study focuses on accounting measures of income and profitability, as (risk-
adjusted) financial returns on bank stocks are equalized by investors in the absence of
prohibitive barriers. For this same reason, Gorton and Rosen (1995) and Schranz (1993)
also focus on accounting measures of profitability when examining managerial
entrenchment and bank takeovers.
The above accounting identity suggests a useful decomposition of realized interest
spreads, i.e. net interest margin, into its constituent parts, i.e. into non-interest income,
overhead, taxes, loan loss provisions, and after-tax bank profits. This approach, with
some modifications, is taken in the study by Hanson and Rocha (1986). As a first step to
analyzing the data, section 3 of the paper provides an accounting breakdown of the net
interest variable, net interest margin, for individual countries and for selected aggregates.
While it may be misleading to compare accounting ratios without controlling for
differences in the macroeconomic environment the banks operate in and the differences in
4See  Vittas  (1991)  for  an account  of  the  pitfalls  in interpreting  bank  operating  ratios.
8their business,  product  mix, and leverage,  these breakdowns  still provide  a useful initial
assessment  of differences  across  countries.
Next,  controlling  for bank characteristics  and the macro  environment,  we provide
an economic  analysis  of the determinants  of the interest and profitability  variables,  net
interest  margin,  and before tax  profit/ta. This empirical  work  also provides  insights  as to
how  bank customers  and the banks themselves  are affected  by these  variables.  The net
interest  margin  regressions  specifically  tell us how the combined  welfare  of depositors
and lenders  is affected  by the spread  determinants.  The relationship  between  the interest
spread  variable  and a bank's corporate  taxes,  for instance,  informs  us to what extent  a
bank is able  to shifts its tax bill forward  to its depositors  and lenders.  Next, the before tax
profit/ta regressions  give  information  on how spread  determinants  affect  bank
shareholders.  Equivalently,  the relationship  between  bank profitability  and bank
corporate  income  taxes reflects  to what extent  a bank can pass on its tax bill to any of its
customers,  depositors,  lenders  or otherwise.3
The subsequent  regression  analysis  starts  from the following  basic equation:
(2)  Iyt = ax + a, Bit+  PAXjt  + ytTt +  6jCj +  s.,
5 Generally,  taxes and  other  variables  can change  interest  rates as well as quantity  variables,  i.e. loan and
deposit  volumes.  In the short  term, the major effects  may come  through  pricing  changes,  in which  case
net interest  margin  and before  tax  profit/ta immediately  yield easily  interpreted  welfare  consequences  for
the banks and  their customers.  With market  imperfections  in the form of credit  rationing  or imperfect
competition  in the credit markets,  changes  in quantities  generally  have first order  welfare  implications
independently  of changes  in prices.  Quantity  changes,  however,  are not pursued  in the empirical  work.
9where  Iu,  =  is the independent  variable  (either  net interest  margin  or before tax  profits/ta)
for bank i in countryj at time t; B., are bank variables  for bank i in countryj at time t; Xj>
are country  variables  for countryj at time t; and T, and Cj are time and country  dummy
variables.  Further,  aO  is a constant,  and ai, ,B,  y, and c5,  are coefficients,  while sit,  is an
error term. Several  specifications  of (2) are estimated  that differ in which  bank and
country  variables  are included.
3.  The data
This study  uses income  statement  and balance  sheet  data of commercial  banks
from the BankScope  data base provided  by IBCA (for a complete  list of data sources  and
variable  definitions,  see  the Appendix).  Coverage  by IBCA is very comprehensive  in
most countries,  with banks included  roughly  accounting  for 90 percent  of the assets  of all
banks.  We started  with the entire  universe  of commercial  banks worldwide,  with the
exception  that for France,  Germany  and the United  States  only several  hundred
commercial  banks listed as 'large' were included.  To ensure  reasonable  coverage  for
individual  countries,  we included  only countries  where  there were at least three  banks in a
country  for a given year.  This yielded a data set covering  80 countries  during  the years
1988-1995,  with about 7900 individual  commercial  bank accounting  observations.  This
data set includes  all OECD  countries,  as well as many developing  countries  and
economies  in transition.  For a list of countries,  see Table 1.
Table 1 provides  country  averages  of interest spreads  and bank profitability.
Column 1  provides  information  on net interest  income  over assets,  or net interest  margin,
10as a percentage.  At the low end,  there are several  developed  countries,  Luxembourg  and
the Netherlands,  and Egypt with a net interest margin of about 1  percent.  For the case of
Egypt,  the low net interest margin can be explained  by a predominance  of low-interest
directed  credits  by the large state  banking  sector. Generally,  developing  countries,  and
especially  Latin  American  countries  such as Argentina,  Brazil,  Costa  Rica, Ecuador  and
Jamaica,  display  relatively  large accounting  spreads. This is also true for certain  Eastern
European  countries  such as Lithuania  and Romania.  Columns  3 though 6 provide  an
accounting  breakdown  of the net interest  income  into its four components:  overhead
minus non-interest  income, taxes, loan loss provisioning,  and net profits, all divided  by
net interest  income.  These shares  add to one hundred  percent  except for cases where
information  on loan loss provisioning  is missing.
The tax/ni variable  reflects  the explicit  taxes paid  by the banks (mostly  corporate
income taxes).  Banks  also face implicit  taxation  due to reserve  and liquidity  requirements
and other  restrictions  on lending  through  directed/subsidized  credit  policies.  These
indirect  forms of taxing  banks show  up directly  in lower  net interest  income  rather than in
its decomposition.  Nonetheless,  the tax/ni  variable  indicates  that there is considerable
international  variation  in the explicit  taxation  of commercial  banks. Several  countries  in
Eastern  Europe  (for example  Lithuania,  Hungary  and the Czech  Republic)  impose  high
explicit  taxes on banking.  The lowest  value of tax/ni is at 0 for Qatar, in the absence of
significant  taxation of banking.  For some  countries,  such as Norway,  Sweden  or Costa
Rica, low tax/ni  values reflect  the tax deductibility  of plentiful  bad debts.
11The loan loss provisioning/ni variable is a direct measure of difference in credit
quality across countries and it also reflects differences in provisioning regulations. This
variable is high for some Eastern European countries. The loan loss provisioning/ni
variable is also high for some developed countries such as France and the Nordic
countries. As a residual, the net profits/ni variable reflects to what extent the net interest
margin translates into net-of-tax profitability.
Columns 7-11 of Table 1 further tabulate the various accounting ratios (relative to
total assets) in the accounting identity (1) presented above. The non-interest income/ta
variable reveals the importance of fee-based services for banks in different countries.
Banks in Eastern Europe, for example in Estonia, Hungary, and Russia, seem to rely
heavily on fee-based operations.  This is also the case in some Latin American countries,
such as, Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Peru and a few African countries as in Nigeria, and
Zambia.
The overhead/ta variable provides information on variation in bank operating
costs across banking systems. This variable reflects variation in employment as well as in
wage levels. Despite high wages, the overhead/ta variable appears to be lowest at around
1 percent for high-income countries, such as Japan and Luxembourg. The overhead/ta
cost measure is notably high at 3.6 percent for the United States, perhaps reflecting the
proliferation of banks and bank branches due to banking restrictions.  In the tax/ta
column, Jamaica, Lithuania, and Romania stand out with high tax-to-assets ratios of
around 2 percent. Loan loss provisioning, proxied by loan loss provisioning/ta, is equally
12high in Eastern  Europe,  and in some  developing  countries.  Finally, net profits over assets,
or net  profit/ta, also tends to be relatively  high in developing  countries.
In Table  2 we present  statistics  on accounting  spreads  and profitability  for
selected  aggregates.  The first breakdown  is by ownership;  a bank is said  to be foreign-
owned  if fifty percent  or more  of  its shares  is owned  by foreign  residents.  The table
displays  a rather small difference  in the net interest  margin  variable  for domestic  banks
(at 3.7 percent)  and foreign  banks (at 2.9 percent).  This small difference,  however,  masks
that foreign  banks tend to achieve  higher interest  margins  in developing  countries,  and
lower  interest  margins  in developed  countries. These facts  may  reflect that foreign  banks
are less subject  to credit allocation  rules and have  technical  advantages  (in developing
countries),  but also have distinct  informational  disadvantages  relative  to domestic  banks
(everywhere).
Interestingly,  foreign  banks pay somewhat  lower  taxes than domestic  banks (as
indicated  by the tax/ta  variable).  This difference  may  reflect different  tax rules governing
domestic  and foreign  banks,  but also foreign  banks' opportunities  to shift  profits
internationally  to minimize  their global  tax bill. Foreign  banks also have a relatively  low
provisioning  as indicated  by loan loss  provisioning/ta,  which is consistent  with the view
that foreign  banks generally  do not engage  in retail  banking  operations.
The next breakdown  in the table is by bank size. For countries  with at least 20
banks,  large banks are defined  as the 10 largest  banks by assets. Large  banks tend to have
6See  Claessens,  Demirgfa9-Kunt  and Huizinga (1997)  for more  detailed  information  on the average
spreads  of domestic  and foreign  banks  for different  groupings  of countries  by income.  This  paper also
considers  how entry  by foreign  banks  affects  the interest  spreads  and operating  costs  of domestic  banks.
13lower  margins  and profits and smaller  overheads.  They also pay relatively  low direct
taxes, and have lower  loan loss provisioning.
The table also considers  bank groupings  by national  income levels and location. 7
Analyzing data on 4 income levels, we see that the net interest margin is highest for the
middle income  groups.  Banks  in the middle  income  group also have the highest  values
for the overhead/ta, tax/ta, and loan loss provisioning/ta variables.  The net profit/ta
variable  tends  to be highest  for banks in the lower income  groups.  Banks  in the high
income group, instead, achieve the lowest net interest margin, and they face the lowest
ratios  of overhead,  taxes, loan loss provisioning,  and net profits to assets.
Next, the breakdown by regions reveals that the net interest  margin  is highest in
the transitional  economies  at 6.4 percent,  and also rather high in Latin  America  at 6.2
percent,  while it is the lowest  for industrialized  countries  at 2.7 percent.  The transitional
countries  further  stand  out with high ratios  of overhead,  taxes, loan  loss provisioning,  and
net profits  to assets.  Industrialized  countries,  have  the lowest net profit/ta value at 0.4
percent,  probably  due to high level of competition  in banking  services. Figures  1 and 2
also illustrate  income  decomposition  for different  regions.
Table  3 provides  information  on some  of the macroeconomic  and institutional
indicators  used in the regression  analysis.  The data is for 1995,  or the most recent  year
available.  The  tax rate variable  is computed  on a bank-by-bank  basis as taxes  paid
divided  by before-tax  profits. The figure  reported in the table is the average  for all banks
in the country  in 1995. The reserves/deposits variable  is defined  as the banking  system's
7For  country  groupings  by income,  see  the World  Development  Report  (1996).  Countries  in transition  are
China,  the Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Hungary,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Romania,  Russia,  and Slovenia.
14aggregate  central  bank reserves  divided  by aggregate  banking  system  deposits.  Actual
reserve  holdings  reflect  required as well as excess  reserves.  Reserves  are generally
remunerated  at less-than-market  rates, and therefore  actual  reserves  may  be a reasonable
proxy for required  reserves,  as averaged  over the various  separate  deposit  categories.  For
several  developing  countries,  Botswana,  Costa  Rica, El Salvador,  Jordan,  and for Greece,
the reserves  ratio is above 40 percent,  indicating  substantial  financial  repression.  In
contrast,  this ratio is rather  low in Belgium,  France  and Luxembourg  at 0.01.
The deposit  insurance  variable  is a dummy  variable  that takes on a value of one if
there is an explicit  deposit  insurance  scheme  (with  defined  insurance  premia and
insurance  coverage),  and a value  of zero otherwise.  Even for the case of an explicit
deposit  insurance  scheme,  however,  the ex post insurance  coverage  may prove  to be
higher than  the de jure coverage,  if the deposit  insurance  agency  chooses  to guarantee  all
depositors.  With  a value of zero,  there is no explicit  deposit  insurance,  even if there  may
be some  type of implicit  insurance  by the authorities.
Next,  the table presents  some indicators  of financial  market structure.  The
concentration  variable  is defined  as the ratio of the three largest  banks' assets to total
banking  sector  assets.  As is well known,  the concentration  of the U.S. banking  market is
rather low, at a value of 16  percent,  compared  to values  of about 50 percent  for France
and Germany. 8 The number  of banks in the table reflects  the number  of banks in the data
set with complete  information.  The banklgdp  ratio defined  as the total assets  of the
deposit  money  banks divided  by GDP. This ratio reflects  the overall level of development
s  The  U.S.  figure  may  understate  the  the  concentration  ratio  in individual  banking  markets,  as  protected
from  outside  competition  by banking  restrictions.
15of the banking sector. The next variable, mcap/gdp is the ratio of stock market
capitalization to GDP, as a measure of the extent of stock market development.
Developing countries tend to have lower bank/gdp and  mcap/gdp ratios, with some
notable exceptions. Malaysia,  South Africa and Thailand, for instance, have relatively
high ratios for both variables.
The final column in the table provides an index of law and order, which is one of
the institutional variables used in the regression analysis. This variable is scaled from 0 to
6, with higher scores indicating sound political institutions and strong court system.
Lower scores, in contrast, reflect a tradition where physical force or illegal means are
used to settle claims. The table reflects that there is considerable variation in legal
effectiveness among countries in the sample.
4.  Empirical results
This section presents regression results. Table 4 and Table 5 report the results of
regressions of the  net interest margin and before tax profit/ta variables, respectively. All
regressions include country and year fixed effects. The tables include several
specifications, with the basic specification including a set of bank-level variables, and
macroeconomic indicators as regressors.  These are important control variables which we
include in all specifications.  Subsequently, we add the taxation variables, the deposit
insurance index, financial structure variables, and legal and institutional indicators.  The
deposit insurance index, is again excluded from the specification in columns 4 and 5,
while the financial structure variables are excluded from the specification in column 5.
16The reason for dropping some variables from regressions 4 and 5 is that we wish to
ensure that banks from a reasonable number of countries is included in the regressions.
The estimation technique is weighted least squares, with the weight being the inverse of
the number of banks for a the country in a given year. This weighing corrects for the fact
that the number of banks varies considerably across countries. The five specifications in
the two tables are discussed in each of the five subsections.
4.1  Bank characteristics and macroeconomic indicators
The first bank characteristic is book value of equity divided by total assets lagged
one period, or equity/tatl  .9 Previously, Buser, Chen and Kane (1981) have examined the
theoretical relationship between bank profitability and bank capitalization. These authors
find that banks generally have an interior optimal capitalization ratio in the presence of
deposit insurance. Generally, banks with a high franchise value - reflecting costly bank
entry - have incentives to remain well-capitalized and to engage in prudent lending
behavior (see Caprio and Summers (1993), and Stiglitz (1996)). Berger (1995) provides
empirical evidence that for U.S. banks there is a positive relationship between bank
profitability and capitalization. The author notes that well-capitalized firms face lower
expected bankruptcy costs for themselves and their customers, thereby reducing their cost
of funding.
The first columns in Table 4 and 5 confirm a positive relationship between the
equity/tar, variable and net interest income and bank profitability.  In the regressions, the
9 The lagging is to correct for the fact that profits - if not paid out in dividends - have a contemporaneous
impact on bank equity.
17equity/tat l variable is also interacted with GDP per capita (measured in units of  constant
$1,000 dollars for the year 1987). The positive coefficient on the interaction variables in
the before tax profit/ta regression can reflect a higher bank franchise value in wealthier
countries. The coefficients for the equity/tat  . variable and the interaction with per capita
GDP together indicate how the equity/assets ratio affects the bank variables in countries
with different income levels. For a country with a per capita GDP of $10,000, for
instance, the point estimate of the effect of the equity/tat.l variable on before tax profit/ta
is 0.067 (or 0.047 + 10x0.002).
Next, there is a negative and significant coefficient on the non-interest earning
assets/ta variable in the net interest margin equation, but there is no significant
relationship for the before tax profit/ta equation. Note that the sign on the non-interest
earning assets/ta variable interacted with per capita GDP is negative in both the net
interest margin and the before tax profit/ta specifications. Apparently, in wealthier
countries the presence of non-interest earning assets depresses net interest income and
profitability more than in poorer countries. By contrast, the sign on loan/ta variable is
positive in the net interest margin equation and negative in the before tax profit/ta
equation.  However, the coefficient of the variable interacted with GDP in the profit
equation is positive, indicating that at higher income levels banks' lending activities tend
to be more profitable.
On the liability side, customer and short-term funding consists of demand
deposits, savings deposits and time deposits. On average, this type of customer funding
may carry a low interest cost, but it is costly in terms of the required branching network.
18In Table 4, we see that this liability category does not significantly affect the net interest
variable, while in Table 5 there is some evidence that it lowers bank profitability.
Differences in overhead may also capture differences in bank business and
product mix, as well as the variation in the range and quality of services.  The overhead to
assets ratio variable, overhead/ta, has an estimated coefficient of  0.173 in the net interest
margin regression, which  suggests that about a sixth of a bank's  overhead cost is passed
on to its depositors and lenders. The interaction of the overhead/ta variable with per
capita GDP also enters with a positive coefficient, indicating there is a larger share of
overhead passed on to financial customers in wealthier countries. This may reflect more
competitive conditions in developed country banking markets than in the developing
countries. In the before tax profit/ta regression the interaction of the  overheadlta variable
with per capita GDP enters negatively indicating that higher overheads eat into bank
profits.
The foreign ownership variable equals one, if at least 50 percent of the bank's
stock is in foreign hands and it is zero otherwise. In both Tables 4 and 5, the foreign
ownership variable has a positive coefficient, while its interaction with per capita GDP
has a negative coefficient. This suggests that foreign banks realize relatively high net
interest margins and profitability in relatively poor countries. This may reflect that
foreign banks are frequently exempt from unfavorable domestic banking regulations, and
may apply,  superior banking techniques. Note that the point estimate of the foreign
ownership effect in the  net interest margin equation for a wealthy country with a per
capita GDP of $20,000, however, is negative at -0.016 (i.e., 0.004 - 20x.00M1),  as is the
19effect on profitability  at -0.015 (i.e., 0.005 - 20x0.001). Foreign banks' technological
and efficiency advantages in developed countries may be insignificant, while there they
do face informational disadvantages. This can explain that on net foreign banks in
developed countries are relatively unprofitable.
Next, we turn to the macro indicators in the regressions. First, per capita GDP has
no significant impact on realized net interest margins, while this variable enters with a
positive coefficient in the profitability equation. The per capita GDP is a general index of
economic development, and thus it reflects differences in banking technology, the mix of
banking opportunities, and any aspects of  banking regulations omitted from the
regression. Growth, defined as the growth rate of per capita real GDP, is insignificant in
both spread and profit regressions. The percentage change in the GDP deflator, or
inflation, is estimated to increase the net interest margin and bank profitability, although
significance of the coefficients in the profitability regressions is low. This may reflect that
banks obtain higher earnings from float, or the delays in crediting customer accounts, in
an inflationary environment. With inflation, bank costs generally also rise. A larger
number of transactions may lead to higher labor costs, and as shown by Hanson and
Rocha (1986, p. 40), result in a higher bank branch per capita ratio. On net, however, the
regression results suggest that the impact of inflation on profitability, while not very
significant, is positive throughout.
The real interest rate is constructed using the short-term government debt yield,
and where not available, other short term market rates. The real interest variable enters
the net interest margin and before tax profit/ta regressions positively in Table 4 and
20Table 5, while this variable interacted with per capita GDP has a significantly negative
coefficient in Table 4.  Thus there is some evidence that real interest rises do not increase
spreads as much in developed countries, perhaps because there deposit rates are not tied
down by deposit rate ceilings as real interest rates rise.
4.2  Taxation variables
Banks are subject to direct taxation through corporate income tax and other taxes;
and they are subject to indirect taxation through  reserve requirements. Reserve
requirements are an implicit tax on banks if, as is usual, official reserves are remunerated
at less-than-market rates. The corporate income tax and the reserve tax differ in important
respects. First, the corporate income tax, in principle at least, can be targeted at pure
profit. Corporate income tax, to the extent it is a profit tax, is relatively undistorting.  10
The reserve tax, by its very nature, is a tax proportional to the volume of deposit taking,
and therefore is a distorting tax.  From a welfare perspective, the corporate income tax
thus appears to be superior to the reserve tax.  A second important difference is that the
severity of the reserve tax depends on the opportunity cost of holding reserves. This may
depend on financial market conditions as much as on any tax code. Related to this
second condition, reserve requirements are also an instrument of monetary policy.
As far as we know, no previous empirical research on the incidence of the
corporate income tax on the banking sector exists. In contrast, several studies have
considered the impact of reserve requirements on bank profitability. Several studies, in
10  In practice, however, the corporate income tax may not be a pure profit tax if complete expensing of
costs is not allowed.
21particular, exist on how Federal Reserve Membership of U.S. commercial banks in the
1970s affected their profitability (see Rose and Rose (1979), and Gilbert and Rasche
(1980)). Fed membership subjected banks to generally higher reserve requirements. The
studies in this area generally support the notion that non-member banks were more
profitable than member banks (with similar characteristics) as they held relatively little
cash. Competition among member and non-member banks in the same market appears to
have prevented member banks from passing their higher reserve cost on to their
customers. In related work, Kolari, Mahajan, and Saunders (1988) have studied the
impact of announcements of reserve requirement changes on bank stock prices using an
event study methodology." 
Since detailed information on the reserve regulation of all our countries is not
available, we use a proxy to capture bank reserves.  The reserves variable in the
regressions is a bank-specific variable computed as the aggregate reserves/deposit ratio of
the banking system (as in Table 3) times the ratio of the bank's customer and short-term
funding to its total assets. Customer and short-term funding, consisting of demand
deposits, saving deposits, time deposits here proxy for reservable deposits. The reserves
variable thus is an approximation of actual bank reserves that reflects differences in
reserve requirement rules.
In Tables 4 and 5, the reserves variable enters the regressions negatively.  The
regression coefficients in the net interest margin equations of Table 4 reflect two effects
I Huizinga  (1996),  and Eijffinger,  Huizinga  and Lemmen  (1996) examine  how nonresident  withholding
taxes  affect  interest  rates,  while  Fabozzi  and Thurston  (1986)  examine  how differences  in  reserve
requirements  are priced  into money  market  instruments.
22(i) less-than-market remuneration, and (ii) the impact on the bank's lending and deposit
rates.  The impact of the first effect is expected to be negative since under-remunerated
reserves lower a bank's net interest income and profitability. The impact of the second
effect could either be zero, in which case the bank bears the full cost of higher reserves,
or positive, indicating that the cost of reserves is passed on to bank customers in terms of
higher interest margins. From the before tax profit/ta regressions in Table 5, we see that
the reserves variable negatively affects bank profitability. This suggests that the second
or pass-through effect is either non-existent, or not large enough to off-set the first or
direct effect. Abstracting from any pass-through, the coefficient on the reserves variable
in either the net interest margin or the before tax profit/ta can also be interpreted as a
bank's  opportunity cost of holding reserves. The reserves variable interacted with per
capita GDP enters the net interest margin and before tax profit/ta regressions positively.
This positive interaction term may reflect that the opportunity cost of holding reserves is
higher in wealthier countries.
We capture the explicit taxes the banks pay with the variable tax rate, which is
measured by a bank's tax bill divided by its pre-tax profits. This variable has a
significantly positive impact on interest margins and profitability. The tax rate variable
interacted with per capita GDP is negative and significant in both regressions. These
results suggest that both the net interest margin and profitability increase with tax rates,
but less so in richer countries. These result suggest that the corporate income tax is passed
through to bank customers to some degree.
23To calculate the extent of this pass-through, we use the estimated coefficients on
the tax rate variable and its interaction with per capita GDP. Let the pass-through be
defined as the increase in pre-tax profits, bp, following a one unit increase in the
corporate tax bill, tax, or 6bp/8tax. Next, note that (6bp/5t)/A  = ,B,  where T is the tax rate,
A are assets, and 1  is estimated at 0.022 -0.0004*per capita GDP. Further 8tax/6it =
(6bp/1t) + bp, as tax = tbp. It now follows that 8bp/6tax = f/(Pr  +  before tax profit/ta).
This expression can be evaluated using mean values of T, before tax profit/ta, and per
capita GDP separately for countries in each of  four income groups (low income, lower
middle income, upper middle income, and high income), where per capita GDP is the
international average for 1995. The calculations suggest that the pass-through coefficient,
8bp/tax,  equals 1.01, 0.72, 1.00, and 1.21 for countries in the four income groups,
respectively.12  Essentially, these results suggest that there is a complete pass-through of
the corporate income tax to bank customers. Thus there is no support for the notion that
the corporate income tax is a nondistorting tax on bank profits. Generally, the corporate
income tax is a source-based tax on domestically employed capital resources. A complete
pass-through of this tax is consistent with the assumption that international investors
demand a net-of-tax return on capital invested in a particular country independent of  the
country's  source-based taxes.
4.3  Deposit insurance
12 For the low income  countries,  before  tax profit/ta  and T have  mean  values  of 0.016  and 0.225  for all
banks, while the average GDP per capita is $426 for the countries in this group in 1995. The calculations
reflect  that in higher income  countries  the mean  value  of before  tax  profit/ta  is lower,  while  the value  of t
changes  little.
24Several studies have previously examined the impact of deposit insurance using
international data. Demirguic-Kunt  and Detragiache (1997) find that the existence of an
explicit deposit insurance is positively associated with the probability of banking crises.
Barth, Nolle and Rice (1997), however,  find that no significant impact of deposit
insurance on banks' return on equity for a sample of 142 banks in 1993. Boyle, and
Stover (1997) estimate that deposit insurance lowers the deposit rate by 25 basis points
using aggregate deposit interest rate data for 13 OECD countries during the 1985-1990
period. These authors discuss that in principle deposit insurance has a theoretically
ambiguous effect on interest margins. On the one hand, the deposit rate for insured
deposits should decrease given the insurance protection. On the other hand, mispriced
deposit insurance provides banks with an incentive to engage in more risky lending
strategies to increase the contingent pay-out from the deposit insurance agency.1 3 This
moral hazard problem and the associated risks can lead bank creditors to demand a higher
interest rate. Also, for a given risk deposit insurance may lead banks to lend money more
cheaply than they otherwise would, depressing net interest margins and profitability.
Even banks that do not engage in risky lending strategies themselves may experience a
downward effect on interest margins on account of bank competition.
The deposit insurance variable equals one if there exists an explicit deposit
insurance regime. For various countries, it varies with time reflecting changes in the
deposit insurance regime during the sample period. The results suggest that an explicit
13 Brewer  and  Mondschean  (1994)  offer  empirical  support  for  the  nation  that  deposit  insurance  creates
incentives  for  banks  to engage  in risky  asset  acquisition  by  examining  the  junk  bond  holdings  of U.S.
banks,  while  Demirguc-Kunt  and  Huizinga  (1993)  argue  that  deposit  insurance  is an important  determinant
of  bank  stock  prices  during  the  international  debt  crisis  period  of the 1980s.
25deposit insurance scheme lowers net interest margins. 14 While the impact on bank profits
is also negative, this result is not significant. The negative effect on profits may not be
significant due the offsetting impact of mispriced subsidies in actual deposit insurance
schemes. These results suggest that explicit deposit insurance regimes do not produce
higher bank profitability and margins, perhaps due to design and implementation
problems.
4.4  Financial structure variables
In column 4 of Tables 4 and 5 we include two sets of financial market or structure
variables. First, we include the market concentration ratio, number of banks and the
bank's total assets, as indicators of market structure and scale effects. Various authors,
such as Gilbert (1984), Berger (1995), and Goldberg and Rai (1996), have pointed out
that such variables may proxy for market power as well as for differences in bank
efficiency. No attempt is made here to distinguish between the corresponding market
power and efficient structure hypotheses.
The second set of variables are financial structure variables in the sense that they
measure the importance of bank and stock market finance - relative to GDP and to each
other. Reasons why these variables matter may also hinge on market power arguments. A
high bank credit-to-GDP ratio, for instance, may reflect a high demand for banking
services fueling competition among banks. Secondly, these variables can reflect any
14 Deposit  insurance  may  affect  margins  and  profits  also  through  its effect  on  financial  structure  by
encouraging  new  entry  and  making  operation  of small  banks  feasible.  However,  when  we  include  financial
structure  variables  in the  regression  the  results  do not  change.
26complementarity or substitutability between bank and stock market finance. The Miller-
Modigliani theorem states that debt and equity finance are purely substitutes in the
absence of taxes and bankruptcy costs.  In practice, however, debt and equity finance may
also be complementary, as modeled in Boyd and Smith (1996). Demirgiiu-Kunt and
Maksimovic (1996) provide empirical evidence that shows that ability to attract equity
capital may also enhance firms' borrowing capacity, especially in underdeveloped
financial markets.  In this setting, easier equity finance may increase rather than reduce
the demand for debt finance reflecting that these sources of finance are complements.
Turning to the first set of market concentration/scale variables, we see that the
bank concentration ratio, has a significant and positive impact on bank profitability, while
bank size, as proxied by total assets, has a significant and positive impact on interest
margins only.  The number of banks variable has no significant impact on either interest
margins or profits.
The second set of financial structure variables have a more significant effect on
bank margins as opposed to bank profits. This may indicate that these variables have a
greater impact on banks' loan and deposit customers compared to other clients. Bank/gdp
ratio has a significantly negative impact on margins and profits, probably reflecting more
intense bank competition in well-developed financial systems. This effect is smaller in
richer countries which already have relatively developed banking sectors. The stock
market capitalization to GDP, or mcap/gdp,  ratio enters the net interest margin equation
positively, which suggests that a larger stock market per se enables banks to obtain higher
interest margins. This may be due to the complementarity effect between debt and equity
27financing discussed above. As stock markets develop, improved information availability
increases the potential pool of borrowers, making it easier for banks to identify and
monitor them. This increases the volume of business for banks, making higher margins
possible. In the regression, the stock market capitalization to banking assets ratio, or
mcap/bank, enters the interest margin equation negatively. This suggests that a larger
stock market relative to the banking sector lowers bank margins, reflecting substitution
possibilities between debt and equity. For both stock market development indicators, the
interaction with per capita GDP enters the  interest margin equation with an opposite
effect. This suggests that any stock market development impact on interest margins is
muted in wealthier countries.
4.5  Legal and institutional indicators
The final columns in Tables 4 and 5 report regressions that include a variety of
legal and institutional indicators. First, the contract enforcement dummy, ranging from 1
to 4, measures the degree to which contractual agreements are honored and not subject to
language and mentality differences. A higher value means greater contract enforcement.
In both the net interest margin and before tax profit/ta regressions, the contract
enforcement variable has a negative and significant sign. Lower contract enforcement
may in fact prompt banks to require higher interest margins and investors to require
higher profitability to compensate for the additional risk. In both regressions, the contract
enforcement variable interacted with per capita GDP enters positively, suggesting a
muted effect of this variable in wealthier countries.
28The law and order index, ranging from 0 to 6, captures the extent to which the
legal system works well in adjucating disputes. From Table 4, we see that a higher value
of the law and order index is significantly associated with lower interest margins. The
reason may again be that the an effective legal system reduces the required risk premia on
bank lending. For this variable, the interaction with per capita GDP enters the equation
negatively, however. Finally, the corruption index, ranging from 0 to 6, reflects a lack of
corruption in government. Specifically, a higher score indicates that government officials
are less likely to take bribes. The results of Table 4 now indicate that cleaner government
(or a higher value for the corruption index) is associated with lower realized interest
spreads, and this less so in wealthier countries.  Again, banks may require a lower risk
premium on their investments in countries which has an environment  relatively free of
corruption. Overall, the regressions indicate that the underlying legal and institutional
variables are important in explaining cross-country variation in interest spreads and bank
profitability.  For two of the three variables, the interaction with per capita GDP has a
coefficient of opposite sign, suggesting muted effects of institutional differences in
wealthier countries.
6.  Conclusions
Banking systems around the world differ widely in size and operation. Across
countries, commercial banks have to deal with different macroeconomic environments,
different explicit and implicit tax policies, deposit insurance regimes, financial market
conditions, and legal and institutional realities. Using a comprehensive cross-country data
29set with bank-level data, this paper analyzes how bank characteristics and the overall
banking environment affect the functioning of banks, as reflected in interest margins and
bank profitability.
In this paper we confirm some findings in earlier research, for instance a positive
relationship between capitalization and profitability, and a negative relationship between
reserves and profitability. Other important determinants of bank margins and
profitability, such as ownership, corporate taxation, financial structure and the legal and
institutional setting have not been considered in the literature.
The paper finds that foreign ownership is associated with higher interest margins
and bank profitability, especially in developing countries. Similarly, several institutional
factors, such as indices of credit rights, law and order and corruption, and differences in
financial structure, have more pronounced effects on interest margins and bank
profitability in developing countries than in developed countries. These results may
reflect the relatively closed nature of banking markets in developing countries.  Coupled
with earlier empirical evidence that a weak institutional environment makes banking
crises more likely (Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1997), these results suggest that
returns to improving underlying institutions are indeed high.
Reserves also have a more pronounced impact on margins and profitability in
developing countries than in developed countries. This latter result may simply reflect the
relatively high opportunity cost of holding reserves in poorer and more inflationary
countries.
30The corporate income tax appears to be passed on fully to bank customers, in
developing and developed countries alike. This finding is consistent with the notion that
bank stock investors require net-of-company-tax returns independent of the level of
company taxation. It also implies that the corporate income tax on banks is likely to
distort the underlying saving and investment decisions, with possibly negative
implications for economic growth. These considerations have to weigh heavily in
considering the merits of the corporate income tax on banks as part of the overall tax
system.
On the other hand, we find that official reserves depress bank profits. Prima facie
this suggests that reserve requirements are a better instrument to tax bank profits than the
corporate income tax. Note that the implicit reserve tax in many countries, however, is
much more variable than the corporate income tax. The level of banking investment and
activity therefore is unlikely to be adjusted to each and every change in the implicit
reserve tax. Variability in the reserve tax therefore can go a long way towards explaining
the responsiveness of bank profits to this tax. These issues are further pursued in
Demirgiic-Kunt and Huizinga (1997).
Several other topics remain for further study. Countries worldwide differ
considerably in the extent of foreign ownership of their banking systems. An interesting
issue is how the entry by foreign banks affects the operation of domestic banking firms.
In principle, foreign entry can affect the pricing by domestic firms, and force them to
reduce their operating costs and to remain competitive. Both of these effects determine
31whether the entry of foreign firms is overall welfare improving.  We address the impact
of foreign entry in Claessens, Demirgiiu-Kunt and Huizinga (1997).
As a related issue, it is interesting to consider what determines foreign bank
entry. Foreign bank entry, and foreign direct investment generally, may well be driven by
the different (worldwide) taxation of domestic and foreign firms rather than simply by
countries' comparative advantage in providing financial services.
We have found some evidence that government regulations, such as the design of
deposit insurance schemes have an impact on bank margins.  It would be interesting to
analyze this issue further by taking into account differences in design features. We intend
to return to these issues in future work.
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BankScope  data base of the IBCA  and in percent.  Net interest margin is defined  as net interest  income over total assets. Overhead/ni  - non-interest
income is overhead  over net interest income - non-interest  income all over assets. Tax/ni is total taxes paid over net interest income.  Loan loss
provision/ni  is loan loss  provisions  over  net interest  income  and Net profit/ni  is net profits  over net interest  income.  Non-interest  income/ta  is net non-
interest  income  over total  assets.  Overhead/ta  is overhead  divided  by total assets. Tax/ta  is taxes  paid over total assets. Loan loss provisuons/ta  is loan
loss  provisions  over  total  assets.  Net profit/ta  is net profits  divided  by total assets.
Net Interest  of which:  Non-int.  Overhead/ta  Tax/ta  Loan loss  Net
margin  Overhd  Tax/ni  Loan  loss  Net  income/ta  prov./ta  profit/ta
-non-  prov./ni  profit/ni
int.inc  /ni
Argentina  7.3  35.6  5.5  28.5  30.3  6.3  9.4  0.4  1.8  2.0
Australia  3.0  32.8  8.5  28.1  33.2  1.3  2.8  0.3  0.7  0.6
Austria  1.7  54.9  6.8  25.7  24.8  0.5  1.5  0.1  0.5  0.3
Bahrain  2.2  30.8  2.7  32.9  43.3  0.8  1.4  0.0  0.6  1.1
Belgium  2.0  48.7  10.2  20.4  24.0  0.9  2.1  0.2  0.4  0.4
Bolivia  3.1  73.7  1.9  12.6  12.6  2.0  5.2  0.6  0.6  -1.1
Botswana  6.0  43.7  11.8  12.9  31.5  2.8  5.4  0.7  0.7  1.9
Brazil  8.9  60.5  11.6  13.8  17.5  4.5  10.2  1.1  1.3  1.4
Canada  2.9  47.3  12.7  21.5  19.0  1.2  2.5  0.4  0.6  0.6
Chile  4.3  71.7  2.4  13.8  14.2  -0.1  3.0  0.1  0.6  0.5
China  2.1  30.0  15.9  . 54.2  1.0  1.6  0.3  . 1.2
Colombia  6.0  53.8  10.3  12.9  27.7  5.8  8.3  0.7  0.9  2.2
Costa  Rica  13.6  40.7  4.7  57.6  9.9  3.5  8.1  0.8  5.7  3.5
Cyprus  1.0  59.1  11.1  15.8  22.0  3.1  3.2  0.3  0.3  0.5
Czech  Rep.  3.3  13.5  23.2  53.4  13.6  1.5  2.1  0.6  2.0  0.3
Denmark  4.8  52.9  5.4  33.3  8.6  1.0  3.7  0.3  1.6  0.3
Dominican  Rep. 6.6  52.8  8.6  9.1  30.9  3.1  6.3  0.6  0.5  2.3
Ecuador  7.7  52.8  4.7  12.8  34.9  3.8  8.1  0.4  1.0  2.5
Egypt  1.4  -32.7  11.2  62.6  63.5  2.1  1.4  0.3  0.7  1.2
El Salvador  3.2  34.3  1.9  14.0  49.8  1.6  2.9  0.1  0.4  1.5
Estonia  4.7  -35.9  24.1  . 111.7  8.7  7.0  1.1  . 5.3
Finland  1.8  50.1  9.4  55.6  -10.7  1.2  2.1  0.2  0.8  -0.1
France  2.4  48.3  7.0  50.8  -1.7  1.4  2.6  0.2  1.0  0.1Table 1. Continued
Net Interest  of which:  Non-int.  Overhead/ta  Tax/ta  Loan  loss  Net
margin  Overhd  Tax/ni  Loan  loss  Net  income/ta  prov./ta  profit/ta
-non-  prov./ni  profit/ni
int.inc/ni
Germany  2.0  51.6  12.3  29.5  12.6  1.1  2.1  0.3  0.6  0.3
Greece  3.0  33.8  12.7  25.7  29.7  2.2  3.4  0.4  0.6  1.0
Guatemala  5.6  80.5  3.6  . 16.0  1.4  5.7  0.2  . 1.1
Haiti  2.8  53.8  7.3  12.4  26.5  2.8  4.2  0.2  0.4  0.8
Honduras  4.3  72.3  9.8  . 17.9  0.9  4.0  0.4  . 0.8
Hong Kong  2.5  17.1  10.2  6.0  67.8  1.3  1.4  0.3  0.2  2.0
Hungary  4.7  17.5  13.7  68.8  29.9  5.8  7.0  0.6  2.7  1.4
India  4.0  18.2  12.4  19.3  50.2  1.6  2.0  0.6  0.7  2.3
Indonesia  3.6  47.5  10.9  17.8  26.2  1.2  2.9  0.4  0.7  0.9
Ireland  3.6  56.4  8.4  11.6  23.5  0.9  2.9  0.3  0.5  0.8
Israel  2.8  41.9  17.1  23.6  17.3  1.8  3.2  0.4  0.7  0.4
Italy  3.4  56.5  14.3  17.4  11.9  1.4  3.3  0.5  0.5  0.4
Jamaica  10.5  33.9  21.2  2.2  43.1  2.8  6.3  2.2  0.3  4.5
Japan  1.6  61.9  16.2  10.0  12.1  0.2  1.3  0.2  0.1  0.2
Jordan  2.1  48.0  10.4  24.1  24.5  1.4  2.4  0.2  0.5  0.5
Korea  1.8  36.4  12.5  34.0  29.9  1.5  2.2  0.2  0.5  0.5
Lebanon  2.7  45.6  9.2  13.7  35.3  0.9  2.1  0.3  0.5  0.9
Lithuania  10.6  29.8  17.5  81.7  -22.2  5.0  7.5  2.0  5.8  0.7
Luxembourg  0.8  -11.5  28.2  52.7  46.0  0.9  1.0  0.2  0.3  0.3
Malaysia  2.7  40.0  15.9  17.3  29.2  0.8  1.9  0.4  0.4  0.8
Malta  2.4  37.6  18.0  6.2  39.1  1.1  2.0  0.4  0.1  0.9
Mexico  4.6  40.8  6.1  42.2  15.4  2.1  4.5  0.3  1.1  0.9
Morocco  3.A  66.8  13.6  0.1  21.9  1.3  3.5  0.5  0.0  0.8
Nepal  3.6  10.5  25.3  16.1  48.1  2.1  2.4  1.0  0.5  1.8
Netherlands  1.4  43.1  9.7  21.4  26.1  1.0  1.7  0.1  0.3  0.4
Nicaragua  4.4  85.2  8.0  18.5  -10.4  3.3  6.3  0.3  0.9  0.2
Nigeria  5.3  -29.3  13.1  88.3  27.8  5.8  7.0  0.7  1.6  1.8
Norway  3.2  51.6  4.6  44.3  3.2  1.2  2.8  0.1  1.4  0.2Table 1. Continued
Net Interest  of which:  Non-int.  Overhead/ta  Tax/ta  Loan  loss  Net
margin  Overhd  Tax/ni  Loan  loss  Net  income/ta  prov./ta  profit/ta
-non.  prov./ni  profit/ni
int.inc/ni
Oman  4.1  43.1  5.5  15.2  36.2  1.4  3.3  0.2  0.6  1.4
Pakistan  2.8  38.8  28.6  . 32.6  1.8  2.9  0.9  . 0.8
Panama  2.1  29.9  4.3  20.3  46.4  1.4  2.0  0.1  0.4  1.0
PapuaN. Guin.  3.2  -2.6  20.2  40.8  45.8  4.2  5.0  0.4  0.9  1.1
Paraguay  5.9  63.5  5.5  11.4  23.3  2.5  6.2  0.4  0.7  1.5
Peru  6.5  43.8  14.3  47.0  12.1  5.7  9.6  0.7  1.7  0.8
Philippines  4.1  29.8  6.6  10.3  55.0  3.0  4.3  0.3  0.4  2.2
Poland  6.1  16.8  27.9  23.3  34.9  2.4  3.6  1.6  1.3  2.1
Portugal  3.3  45.9  8.0  25.5  23.7  1.0  2.5  0.3  0.9  0.7
Qatar  1.9  6.6  0.0  15.0  85.2  1.1  1.3  0.0  0.2  1.6
Romania  9.7  1.9  26.2  36.8  44.3  2.4  2.8  2.3  3.7  4.3
Russia  4.7  -5.0  33.3  47.2  37.1  10.9  7.0  1.9  2.6  4.7
Singapore  2.2  20.7  21.6  8.7  56.4  1.0  1.4  0.5  0.1  1.3
S. Africa  3.9  45.1  11.8  16.1  29.0  1.9  3.6  0.5  0.7  1.1
Spain  3.6  60.3  10.2  17.7  12.7  1.2  3.2  0.4  0.6  0.7
SriLanka  3.7  31.8  11.1  9.7  52.5  2.0  3.0  0.5  0.4  2.1
Swaziland  5.4  52.1  16.3  2.8  30.9  2.7  5.5  0.9  0.2  1.7
Sweden  3.1  26.3  1.9  64.6  11.2  1.5  2.5  0.1  1.9  0.3
Taiwan  2.0  34.6  10.1  10.8  45.5  1.0  1.6  0.2  0.2  1.0
Tunisia  2.3  31.4  9.9  56.1  48.0  2.2  3.1  0.2  1.1  0.8
Turkey  6.3  11.7  10.0  32.9  47.2  4.0  5.4  0.8  0.8  3.3
U.K.  2.3  18.4  20.6  29.8  40.9  2.3  3.0  0.4  0.7  0.8
U.S.  3.9  47.6  12.5  15.2  25.8  1.8  3.6  0.5  0.7  1.0
Venezuela  7.2  49.9  2.7  16.7  30.6  2.8  6.4  0.2  1.0  2.5
Yemen  4.0  48.8  14.1  2.6  34.6  -0.5  1.4  0.6  0.1  1.4
Zambia  -4.7  186.1  -6.6  -49.1  -30.4  9.5  0.4  0.3  2.4  1.7Table 2. Bank Spreads and Profitability: Selected Aggregates 1988-1995
Net interest  margin  is defined  as net interest  income  over total assets.  Non-interest  income  +overhead/ni  is net non-interest  income  plus overhead  over
net interest  income. Tax/ni is total taxes  paid over  net interest  income.  Loan  loss provision/ni  is loan loss provisions  over  net interest income  and Net
profit/ni  is net profits over  net interest income.  Overhead/ta  is overhead  divided  by total assets.  Non-interest  income/ta  is net non-interest  income over
total assets.  Tax/ta  is taxes  paid over  total assets. Loan loss  provisions/ta  is loan loss provisions  over  total assets.  Net profit/ta is net profits divided  by
total assets. All ratios are in percentages.  Data  are from  BankScope  data  base of the IBCA  and in percent.  A foreign  bank is defined  as having  at least
50 percent foreign  ownership. Large category includes  the largest  ten banks and the remaining  banks are classified  as small. Large versus small
distinction  is made only if there are more than 20 banks in a given year. The data by income group and by region  are means of country averages.
Income  and region  classifications  follow  World  Bank  definitions  as published  in  the World  Development  Report (1996).
Net int.  of which:  Non-int.  Overhead/  Tax/ta  Loan  Net
margin  overhd  Tax/ni  Loan loss  Net  income/ta  ta  loss  profit/ta
-non-  prov./ni  profit/ni  prov./ta
int.inc. /ni
Total  3.5  43.1  11.5  24.8  20.6  1.6  3.2  0.3  0.8  0.8
Ownership
Domestic  3.7  46.2  11.1  22.8  19.9  1.6  3.3  0.4  0.8  0.8
Foreign  2.9  29.0  13.1  33.5  24.4  1.6  2.8  0.3  0.7  0.8
Size
Large  2.6  35.5  13.1  27.5  23.9  1.2  2.5  0.3  0.6  0.5
Small  3.4  48.0  11.9  22.0  18.2  1.5  3.1  0.4  0.7  0.7
Income Groups
Low income  2.8  37.9  11.3  20.0  30.8  3.2  3.1  0.5  0.8  1.5
Lower middle income  5.7  36.8  11.0  24.9  27.2  3.2  5.1  0.7  1.3  1.8
Upper middle income  4.1  32.7  11.2  27.3  28.8  2.1  3.8  0.4  1.0  0.9
High income  2.6  30.0  10.3  31.8  27.9  1.2  2.3  0.2  0.7  0.5
Regions
Africa  4.8  49.2  11.1  18.6  22.4  3.5  5.3  0.6  0.8  1.5
Asia  3.0  20.1  14.7  17.3  47.9  1.8  2.4  0.4  0.5  1.5
Latin America  6.2  48.7  6.8  21.1  23.4  3.1  6.2  0.5  1.1  1.5
MiddleEastandNorth  2.9  26.1  8.5  23.4  41.9  1.6  2.6  0.3  0.5  1.1
Africa
Transitional economies  6.4  13.2  21.8  51.9  13.1  4.4  4.5  1.4  3.0  1.9
Industrial economies  2.7  32.9  10.4  34.7  21.9  1.2  2.5  0.3  0.8  0.4Table 3.  Economic and Institutional  Indicators
GDP/CAP is the real GDP per capita in US$. Inflation is the annual inflation of the GDP deflator. Both are obtained from World Bank National Accounts. Tax rate is defined as
the total taxes paid by banks divided by before tax profits. It is from BankScope data base by IBCA.  Reserves/deposits is defined as the reserves of the banking system over
deposits, from IMF, International Financial Statistics.  Deposit Insurance is a dummy variable which takes the value one if there is an explicit deposit insurance scheme in place
zero otherwise. It is compiled from Kyei (1995) and Talley and Mas (1990).  Concentration is defined as the ratio of largest three bank assets to total banking assets. Number of
banks is the number of banks in the data set with complete information.  Both variables are obtained from BankScope data base.  Bank/gdp is the total assets of the deposit money
banks divided by GDP. It is obtained from IMF, International Financial Statistics. Mcap/gdp is the stock market capitalization divided by GDP. Stock market data are from IFC's
Emerging Market Data Base. Law and order indicator, produced by International  Country Risk rating agency,  reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept
the established institutions to make and  implement laws and adjudicate disputes. It is scored 0-6 with higher scores indicating sound political institutions and a strong court system.
Lower scores indicate a tradition of depending on physical force or illegal means to settle claims.  For all variables 1995 figures were reported, if available. Otherwise figures are for the
most recent year available.
Gdp/cap  Inflation  Tax rate  Reserves/  Deposit  Concentration  No. of  Bank/gdp  Mcap/gdp  Law and
(US $)  deposits  insurance  banks  order
Argentina  3825  0.02  0.15  0.06  1  0.48  11  0.23  0.13  5
Australia  14542  0.03  0.47  0.02  0  0.45  44  0.77  0.70  6
Austria  16947  0.02  0.23  0.04  1  0.75  12  1.27  0.14  6
Bahrain  7902  0.02  0.01  0.10  n.a.  0.94  7  0.49  n.a  5
Belgium  16197  0.03  0.27  0.01  1  0.46  49  1.53  0.39  6
Bolivia  665  0.11  0.10  n.a.  0  0.57  11  0.43  0.01  3
Botswana  1844  0.18  0.32  0.41  n.a.  0.94  5  0.14  0.09  n.a.
Brazil  2113  22.95  0.38  0.13  0  0.43  56  0.32  0.21  3
Canada  16091  0.02  0.35  0.01  1  0.56  72  0.72  0.65  6
Chile  2481  0.12  0.07  0.08  1  0.40  23  0.45  1.10  5
China  468  0.12  0.21  n.a.  0  0.99  5  0.80  0.06  n.a
Colombia  1445  0.23  0.18  0.23  1  0.35  28  0.20  0.22  2
CostaRica  1936  0.23  0.09  0.59  0  0.76  22  0.15  0.07  n.a.
Cyprus  7500  0.03  0.34  0.16  n.a  0.75  9  0.91  0.30  5
CzechRep.  3165  0.15  2.01  0.18  1  0.76  15  0.87  0.33  n.a.
Denmark  22386  0.02  0.16  0.07  1  0.77  56  0.55  0.33  6
Dominican Rep.  829  0.13  0.19  0.25  1  0.62  13  0.17  n.a.  4
Ecuador  1243  0.23  0.12  0.10  0  0.89  6  0.24  0.15  4
Egypt  709  0.12  0.25  0.20  0  0.89  9  0.65  0.13  4
El Salvador  994  0.12  0.04  0.32  1  0.86  4  0.28  0.67  3Table  3. Continued
Gdp/cap  Iflation  Tax rate  Reserves/  Deposit  Concentration  No. of  Banl/gdp  Mcap/gdp  Law and
(US S)  deposits  insurance  banks  order
Estonia  2820  0.29  0.20  n.a.  0  n.a.  7  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Finland  18275  0.03  0.48  0.15  1  0.70  12  0.70  0.35  6
France  18128  0.01  0.26  0.01  1  0.48  98  0.99  0.34  6
Germany  16572  0.02  0.56  0.04  1  0.50  82  1.19  0.24  6
Greece  5140  0.10  0.21  0.46  1  0.70  16  0.40  0.15  6
Guatemala  898  0.10  0.10  0.32  0  0.29  24  0.16  n.a.  3
Haiti  230  0.72  0.25  0.35  n.a.  1.00  3  0.10  n.a.  3
Honduras  900  0.25  0.33  0.14  0  1.00  3  0.22  0.09  3
HongKong  11911  0.02  0.13  n.a.  0  0.44  35  n.a.  2.17  6
Hungary  2330  0.20  0.13  n.a.  1  0.40  22  0.40  0.04  n.a.
India  423  0.06  0.04  0.16  1  0.90  5  0.35  0.38  4
Indonesia  718  0.13  0.30  n.a.  0  0.38  21  0.41  0.33  5
Ireland  13653  0.01  0.26  0.05  1  0.75  12  0.46  0.42  6
israel  10515  0.10  0.53  0.07  0  0.48  26  0.91  0.42  5
Italy  15491  0.05  0.48  n.a.  1  0.27  66  0.62  0.11  6
Jatnaica  1573  0.33  0.24  0.33  0  0.52  10  0.30  0.41  3
Japan  23960  0.02  0.57  0.01  1  0.21  81  1.32  0.72  6
Jordan  1263  0.02  0.31  0.49  0  0.93  7  0.70  0.70  5
Korea  5663  0.06  0.26  0.10  0  0.17  43  0.55  0.40  5
Lebanon  1800  n.a.  0.24  0.16  1  0.61  6  0.79  n.a.  n.a.
Lithuania  1233  0.36  0.37  0.14  0  0.76  8  0.17  0.03  n.a.
Luxembourg  21433  0.07  0.45  n.a.  1  0.30  108  0.41  0.14  6
Malaysia  3108  0.06  0.32  0.12  0  0.31  49  0.84  2.82  5
Malta  6102  0.04  0.29  0.08  n.a.  0.69  7  0.75  n.a.  n.a.
Mexico  1749  0.45  0.20  0.23  1  0.59  20  0.35  0.32  3
Morocco  853  0.07  0.34  0.07  n.a.  0.63  8  0.46  0.18  6
Nepal  203  0.07  0.35  n.a.  n.a.  1.00  3  0.22  0.06  n.a.
Netherlands  17187  0.02  0.21  0.01  1  0.84  25  1.14  0.90  6
New  Zealand  12008  0.08  0.28  0.03  0  0.52  8  0.87  0.53  6
Nicaragua  786  0.09  0.22  0.27  0.63  13  0.32  n.a.  n.a.Table 3. Continued
Gdp/cap  Inflation  Tax rate  Reserves/  Deposit  Concentration  No. of  Bank/gdp  Mcap/gdp  Law and
(US $)  deposits  insurance  banks  order
Nigeria  339  0.65  0.06  0.14  1  0.87  9  0.13  0.03  3
Norway  23083  0.03  0.16  0.01  1  0.52  27  0.68  0.31  6
Oman  5696  0.04  0.12  0.05  0  0.69  6  0.29  0.15  5
Pakistan  377  0.14  0.53  0.19  0  0.73  15  0.37  0.16  2
Panama  2435  0.05  0.08  n.a.  n.a.  0.54  9  0.69  0.10  3
PapuaNew Guinea  1104  0.03  0.23  0.03  n.a.  0.78  5  0.31  n.a  3
Paraguay  1049  0.13  0.17  0.33  0  0.35  23  0.20  n.a.  4
Peru  1046  0.13  0.43  0.32  1  0.65  22  0.13  0.20  3
Philippines  615  0.07  0.12  0.12  1  0.44  21  0.43  0.79  4
Poland  1903  4.65  0.40  0.10  1  0.45  32  0.29  0.04  n.a.
Portugal  5199  0.11  0.14  0.03  1  0.32  38  0.88  0.19  6
Qatar  12820  n.a.  0.01  0.04  n.a.  1.00  2  0.71  n.a.  n.a.
Romania  1341  2.16  0.30  0.33  0  0.70  7  0.15  n.a.  n.a.
Russia  1989  1.90  0.46  0.19  0  0.44  18  0.12  0.05  n.a.
S. Africa  2176  0.09  0.23  0.04  0  0.71  15  0.67  2.09  4
Saudi Arabia  5316  0.04  0.00  n.a.  0  0.96  4  0.41  0.33  5
Singapore  13436  0.04  0.29  0.08  0  0.48  19  0.96  1.74  6
Spain  9137  0.05  0.26  0.08  1  0.50  49  1.01  0.35  4
Sri Lanka  640  0.11  0.23  n.a.  0  0.63  7  n.a  n.a.  n.a.
Swaziland  787  0.47  0.16  0.21  n.a.  n.a.  4  0.23  0.30  n.a.
Sweden  19387  0.04  -4.91  n.a.  0  0.41  18  0.62  0.78  6
Taiwan  7268  0.02  0.18  n.a.  1  0.40  25  n.a.  n.a.  5
Thailand  1807  0.04  0.31  0.04  0  0.49  14  0.98  0.86  5
Tunisia  1464  0.05  0.20  0.04  n.a.  0.55  8  0.55  0.22  n.a.
Turkey  1848  1.06  0.14  0.27  1  0.43  29  0.17  0.17  5
U.K.  13478  0.02  0.36  n.a.  1  0.39  71  1.12  1.27  6
U.S.  20931  0.01  0.27  0.03  1  0.16  372  0.48  0.95  6
Venezuela  2651  0.51  0.06  0.25  1  0.46  17  0.13  0.05  4
Yemen  280  n.a.  0.51  n.a  n.a.  1.00  3  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
Zambia  247  0.55  0.34  0.08  0  1.00  3  0.10  n.a.  4Table 4. Determinants  of Net Interest  Margins
The regression  is estimated  using  weighted  least squares  pooling  bank level data across  80 countries  for the 1988-
95 time period.  Number of banks in each period is used to weight the observations.  Regression  also includes
country  and time dummy  variables  which are not reported. Dependent  variable  is the net interest  margin defned
as interest  income  minus  interest  expense  over  total assets. Detailed  variable  definitions  and data sources  are given
in the appendix. Standard  errors  are given in parentheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Bank Characteristics
Equity/ta  .046***  .047***  .044***  .064***  .063***
(.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.006)
Equity/ta  1 x gdpfcap  -.001  .000  -.001  -.002**  -.002***
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)
Loan/ta  .017***  .008**  .012***  .022***  .019***
(.004)  (.004)  (.004)  (.004)  (.004)
Loan/ta xgdp/cap  -.000  .001***  .001***  .000  .000
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
Non-interest  earning  assets/ta  -.016**  ...020***  -.021***  -.011  -X020***
(.007)  (.007)  (.008)  (.007)  (.007)
Non-interest  earning  assets/tax  gdp/cap  -.001*  -.001  .000  -.002**  -.001
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)
Customer  &short  term  funding/ta  -.007  .003  .004  -.000  -.004
(.005)  (.005)  (.006)  (.005)  (.005)
Cust.  & shrt  term funding/ta  x gdp/cap  .000  -.000  .000  -.000  .000
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.001)
Overhead/ta  .173***  o025***  .213***  .141***  .310***
(.022)  (.019)  (.019)  (.018)  (.019)
Overhead/ta  x gdp/cap  .002***  .004*  .004*  .009***  .005***
(.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)
Foreign  ownership  dummy  .004***  .003**  .004***  .004***  .003***
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)
Foreign  ownership  dummy  x gdp/cap  -.001***  -.001***  -.001***  -.000***  -.000***
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
Macro Indicators
Gdp/cap  .000  .000  .000  .000  -.011***
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.002)
Growth  004  .005  .006  -.011  -.020**
(.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.007)
Inflation  .021***  .026***  .025***  .020***  .003
(.006)  (.006)  (.006)  (.006)  (.005)
Real  interest  .044***  .060***  .058***  .051***  .025***
(.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.007)  (.006)
Real  interest  x gdp/cap  .001  -.004**  -.003*  -.005***  -.000
(.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)
Taxation
Reserves  ->.D76*** -.076***  -.024*  -.104***
(.015)  (.015)  (.016)  (.016)
Reserves  x gdp/cap  .011***  .011***  .009***  .004
(.003)  (.003)  (.003)  (.004)
Tax rate  .016***  .015***  .017***  .017***
(.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)
Tax rate x gdp/cap  -.001***  -.001***  -.001***  ..001***
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
** and *** indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and I percent respectively.Table 4. Continued
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Deposit Insurance













Mcap/bank x gdp/cap  .001**
(.001)








Contract  enforcement  dummy  -.042***
(.007)
Contract enforcmt dummy x gdp/cap  .003***
(.001)
Law  & order index  -.003***
(.001)




Corruption x gdp/cap  .001***
(.000)
Adj  .50  .51  .50  .58  .63
N. of obs  5841  5276  5212  5054  4497
** and *** indicate  significance  levels  of 10,  5 and I percent  respectively.Table 5. Determinants of Bank Profitability
The regression  is estimated  using  weighted  least squares  pooling  bank level data across  80 countries  for the 1988-
95 time period. Number of banks in each period is used to weight the observations.  Regression  also includes
country  and time dummy  variables  which are not reported. Dependent  variable is the before  tax profits  divided  by
total assets. Detailed  variable  definitions  and data sources  are given in the appendix. Standard  errors are given in
parentheses.
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Bank Characteristics
Equity/ta  t-  .047***  .051***  .055***  .058**  .015***
(.009)  (.009)  (.009)  (.010)  (.006)
Equity/ta  .1l x gdp/cap  .002  .002***  .003***  .002***  .003***
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)
Loan/ta  -.013***  -.024***  -.023**  -.015***  -.018***
(.005)  (.005)  (.005)  (.005)  (.004)
Loan/ta xgdp/cap  .001***  .003***  .003***  .003***  .001***
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
Non-interest  earning  assets/ta  -.005  -.010  -.011  -.014  -.033***
(.010)  (.010)  (.010)  (.010)  (.007)
Non-interest  earning  assets/tax  gdp/cap  -.007***  -.007***  -.007***  -.008***  .002**
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)
Customer  &short  term funding/ta  -.029***  -.017**  -.014***  -.031***  -.051***
(.006)  (.007)  (.008)  (.001)  (.005)
Cust. &  shrt  term funding/ta  x gdp/cap  .002***  -.000  -.000  .001  .002***
(.000)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.000)
Overhead/ta  -.023  -.006  -.004  -.024  -.114***
(.025)  (.026)  (.026)  (.026)  (.019)
Overhead/ta  x gdp/cap  -.030***  -.049***  -.049***  -.048***  .007***
(.003)  (.003)  (.003)  (.003)  (.002)
Foreign  ownership  dummy  .005***  .006***  .006***  .006***  .006***
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.001)
Foreign  ownership  dummy  x gdp/cap  -.001***  -.001***  -.001***  -.001***  .000***
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
Macro Indicators
Gdp/cap  .008***  .008***  .008***  .007***  .000
(.001)  (.001)  (.001)  (.002)  (.002)
Growth  .002  -.006  -.007  -.019  .004
(.010)  (.011)  (.011)  (.011)  (.007)
Inflation  .011  .015*  .014*  .009  .011*
(.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.008)  (.005)
Real interest  .023***  .029***  .029***  .023***  .026***
(.009)  (.010)  (.010)  (.009)  (.006)
Real interest  x gdp/cap  -.000  -.001  -.001  -.000  -.003**
(.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)  (.002)
Taxation
Reserves  .. 126***  -.129***  -.106***  -.091***
(.021)  (.021)  (.023)  (.016)
Reservesx  gdp/cap  .029***  .031***  .032***  .005***
(.004)  (.004)  (.004)  (.004)
Tax rate  .022***  .022***  .021***  .017***
(.003)  (.003)  (.003)  (.002)
Tax rate x gdp/cap  -.000  -.000**  -.003**  .000***
(.000)  (.000)  (.000)  (.000)
** and  ***  indicate  significance  levels  of 10,  5 and  I percent  respectively.Table 5. Continued
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)
Deposit  Insurance













Mcap/bank  x gdp/cap  -.001
(.001)




Total assets  ($)  .000
(.000)
Legal and  Institutional
Indicators
Contract enforcement dummy  -.022***
(.007)
Contract  enforcmt.  dummy  x gdp/cap  .001***
(.001)
Law & order index  -.000
(.001)




Corruption  x gdp/cap  -.000
(.000)
Adj R 2 .21  .27  .27  .31  .35
N. of obs  5841  5276  5212  5054  4497




6  U non-interest  income
U net  interest  margin
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